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Jerzy Kowalski-Glikman, "Ateny, Jerozolima, Pcim..." (2005) pdf

Recenzja: Francis Wheen, Jak brednie podbiły świat (Muza, Warszawa 2005), "Świat Nauki" Grudzień 2005, s. 83, http://www.swiatnauki.pl/pdf.pdz?pokplik=4431

Imre Lakatos, "Science and Pseudoscience" (1973) audio MP3

Science and Pseudoscience. --- Science and Pseudoscience was originally broadcast on 30 June 1973 as Programme 11 of The Open University Arts Course A303, 'Problems of Philosophy' and its text was subsequently published in Philosophy in the Open edited by Godfrey Vesey, Open University Press, 1974 and also as the Introduction to Lakatos's The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (edited by John Worrall and Gregory Currie) Cambridge University Press, 1978. A Hungarian language version of the talk was broadcast by the BBC Hungarian World Service on 10th February 1974, eight days after Lakatos died on 2 February. Whilst based at the Hungarian Ministry of Culture in the later 1940s, he had been a leading figure in the immediate post-war Hungarian state higher-education reform that radically expanded popular access to higher education. It is recognised by UNESCO as one of the first and most outstanding national examples of the realisation of clause 1of Article 26 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in respect of its declaration that "higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit." Science and Pseudoscience is Lakatos's most succinct public summary of his philosophy of science. In this talk he outlines his distinctive view of the importance of 'the demarcation problem' in the philosophy and history of science, namely the normative methodological problem of distinguishing between science and pseudo-science, and of why its solution is not merely an issue of 'armchair philosophy', but also one of vital social and political significance, and even of life and death itself. It reviews what he saw as the inadequacies of previous attempted solutions, such as both probative and probabilist inductivism, and how his own methodology of scientific research programmes solves some of the problems posed by the history of science for those of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. He proposes that scientists regard the successful theoretical prediction of stunning novel facts - such as the return of Halley's comet or the gravitational bending of light rays - as what demarcates good scientific theories from pseudo-scientific and degenerate theories, and in spite of all scientific theories being forever confronted by "an ocean of counterexamples". The talk includes his novel fallibilist analysis of the development of Newton's celestial dynamics, Lakatos's favourite historical example of his methodology. In her speech at the opening ceremony of the LSE Lakatos Building on 15 November 2001, Professor Nancy Cartwright FBA, Chair of the Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) described Lakatos's philosophy of science, first published almost 40 years ago, as still unsuperseded. The 20 minute talk is essentially a brief summary of the central thesis of what sadly turned out to be the last annual course of Lakatos's renowned highly entertaining LSE lectures on Scientific Method, given in Autumn 1973, with their historical style of reviewing previous attempted solutions to the demarcation problem within the context of the history of dogmatism versus scepticism, and frequently punctuated by gales of laughter at his many characteristic intellectual jokes and amusing anecdotes whenever he lectured to an audience. The full contents of this last lecture course - but without the gales of laughter - are now published in an edited form as Chapter 1 of For and Against Method: Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend, edited by Matteo Motterlini, University of Chicago Press, 1999. The full unedited versions of their transliterations by Sandra Mitchell from original recordings of the lectures are available in the LSE Library Lakatos Archive. The full version of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes was published in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1970. Some historical case studies in Lakatos's methodology were published in Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: the critical background to modern science 1800 to 1905, edited by Colin Howson and Method and Appraisal in Economics edited by Dr Spiro Latsis, both published by Cambridge University Press, 1976. There have been many publications on Lakatos's philosophy since his death, which have notably increased in the last 5 years as the intellectual world gradually begins to realise the depth and historical significance of his philosophy concentrated in his PhD thesis (or Proofs and Refutations) and just a few brief monographs. The latest of these publications is Appraising Lakatos: Mathematics, Methodology and the Man (Vienna Circle Institute Library) (edited by Kampis, Kvas, and Stoltzner) Kluwer, 2002, being the outcome of a conference at Eotvos University, Budapest in November 1997 to mark Lakatos's 75th birthday. This MP3 file will play in a variety of ways dependent upon the web browser used and its configuration. The file will either play as it is downloaded - known as 'streaming' - or download first before playing. The later will take sometime when connected to the Internet via a slow network connection. If you encounter problems, please ensure that you have a suitable helper application set or browser plug-in installed.

Derek D. Turner, "The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism" (2004)

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 2004, vol. 35, pp. 1–17. --- Abstract --- Scientific realism is fundamentally a view about unobservable things, events, processes, and so on, but things can be unobservable either because they are tiny or because they are past. The familiar abductive arguments for scientific realism lend more justification to scientific realism about the tiny than to realism about the past. This paper examines both the ‘‘basic’’ abductive arguments for realism advanced by philosophers such as Ian Hacking and Michael Devitt, as well as Richard Boyd’s version of the inference to the best explanation of the success of science, and shows that these arguments provide less support to historical than to experimental realism. This is because unobservably tiny things can function both as unifiers of the phenomena and as tools for the production of new phenomena, whereas things in the past can only serve as unifiers of the phenomena. The upshot is that realists must not suppose that by presenting arguments for experimental realism they have thereby defended realism in general.

Christian C. Carman, "The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth: comments on D.D. Turner's 'The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism'" (2005)

"Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" 2005, vol. 36, pp. 171–173. --- Abstract: --- Turner [The past vs. the tiny: Historical science and the abductive arguments for realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35A (2004) 1] claims that the arguments in favor of realism do not support with the same force both classes of realism, since they supply stronger reasons for experimental realism than for historical realism. I would like to make two comments, which should be seen as amplifications inspired by his proposal, rather than as a criticism. First, it is important to highlight that Turner's distinction between 'tiny' and 'past unobservables' is neither excluding nor exhaustive. Second, even if we agreed with everything that Turner says regarding the arguments for realism and their relative weight in order to justify the experimental or historical version, there is an aspect that Turner does not consider and that renders historical realism less problematic than experimental realism.

M.V. Simkin, V.P. Roychowdhury, "Read before you cite!" (2002)

 

M. Heller, M. Kokowski, M. Olejnik, A. Olszewski, W. Wójcik, "Czy darwinizm jest metafizycznym programem badawczym czy teorią naukową?" (1998)

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce 1998, z. 22, s. 93-113.

Jerzy Baczyński, Adam Szostkiewicz, "Rozmowa z księdzem profesorem Michałem Hellerem" (2004)

"Polityka" nr 52/2004 (2485).

Jan Such, "Rozwój Wszechświata w ujęciu kosmologicznym oraz filozoficznym" (2001) pdf

w: Krzysztof Łastowski, Paweł Zeidler (red.), Zaproszenie di filozofii. Wykłady z filozofii dla młodzieży, Wydawnictwo Humaniora, Poznań 2001. s. 9-18; http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/%7Einsfil/mlodziez/such.pdf

Jan Such, "Teoria Wielkiego Wybuchu a problem wieczności świata" (2002) pdf

w: Krzysztof Łastowski, Paweł Zeidler (red.), Tropami filozofii. Wykłady z filozofii dla młodzieży, tom 2, Wydawnictwo Fundacji Humaniora, Poznań 2002, s. 9-14; http://www.staff.amu.edu.pl/%7Einsfil/mlodziez/tropami/such.pdf

Kurt Riezler. Physics and Reality.

Kurt Riezler. Physics and Reality. Lectures of Aristotle on Modern Physics at an International Congress of Science, 679 Olymp./1940 A.D., Cambridge. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, Conn, 1940

Leon R. Kass, "The Permanent Limitations of Biology" (2002) pdf

Leon R. Kass, "The Permanent Limitations of Biology", chapter 10 of Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity. The Challenge for Bioethics, Encounter Books, San Francisco 2002, s. 277-305.

Bradley Monton, "God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence" (2005)

Abstract: The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. Keywords: fine-tuning argument, argument from design, ur-probability

J.W. Moffat, "Cosmic Microwave Background, Accelerating Universe and Inhomogeneous Cosmology" (2005)

http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/astro-ph/pdf/0502/0502110.pdf

John Updike, "The Accelerating Expansion of the Universe" (2005) pdf

"Physics Today" April 2005, vol. 58, issue 4, p. 39.

Krzysztof Zbytniewski, "Kosmiczny ksiądz i Marsjanie" (2004)

16 stycznia 2004; wywiad z Michałem Hellerem. Początek: "O tym, czy jesteśmy w Kosmosie sami, czy Jezus umarł także za grzechy kosmitów, i czego powinny uczyć się o stworzeniu świata dzieci, opowiada nam wybitny kosmolog, fizyk i filozof ksiądz profesor Michał Heller."

David C. Lindberg, Ronald L. Numbers, "Metahistoryczne uwagi o konflikcie nauki i teologii" (1997) pdf

"Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce" 1997, t. XX, s. 3–19; http://www.obi.opoka.org/zfn/020/zfn02001Lindberg.pdf

Michał Heller, "Ślepy zoolog" (recenzja: Richard Dawkins, Ślepy zegarmistrz) (1997 ) pdf

"Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce" 1997, t. 20, s. 146-148; http://www.obi.opoka.org/zfn/020/zfn02019Heller.pdf

George V. Coyne, S.J., "Ludzka osoba a ewolucja według doktryny katolickiej (z dziejów dialogu nauka-wiara)" 1997 pdf

"Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce" 1997, t. 21, s. 9-16; http://www.obi.opoka.org/zfn/021/zfn02102Coyne.pdf

Francis Galton, "'The part of religion in human evolution" (1894)

"National Review" 1894 vol. 23, s. 755-63; http://galton.org/

Francis J. Beckwith, "Gimme That Ol' Time Separation: A Review Review" (2005)

"Chapman Law Review" Spring 2005, vol. 8, no, 1. s. 329-327.

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